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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Intrusion detection is defined as identifying 
unauthorized use, misuse and abuse of computer 
systems by both inside and outside intruders. The 
main task of an intrusion detection system (IDS) is to 
defend a computer system or computer network by 
detecting hostile attacks on a network system or host 
device (Khan Pathan, 2014), monitoring the events 
occurring in a computer system or network and 
analyzing them for signs of intrusions. Security 
incidents resulting from attempted attacks violate the 
CIA triad of computer security; Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) defines intrusion 
as an attempt to compromise CIA or to bypass the 
security mechanisms of a computer network (Bace 
and Mell, 2001).  
An IDS identifies, logs and reports possibly 
security incidents. It is the software or hardware 
system to automate the intrusion detection process 
and is typically placed inline, at a spanning port of a 
switch, or on a hub in place of a switch (Pappas, 
2008). 
 
2. IDEAL INTRUSION DETECTION 
SYSTEM  
 
2.1. Materials and Procedures 
An ideal intrusion system should address the 
issues below, regardless of the mechanism it is based 
on, to defend against attacks and intrusions. Some of 
them are described below (Vinchurkar & 
Reshamwala, 2012): 
• The system should be able to run 
continuously without human supervision. It 
must be reliable enough to be run in the 
background of the system being observed.  
• It should not be a "black box", which means 
its internal workings should be examinable 
from outside.  
• It must be fault tolerant, which means that it 
must survive a system crash and not have its 
database rebuilt at restart.  
• It must resist destruction. The system can 
monitor itself to ensure that it has not been 
subverted.  
• It should observe and record deviations from 
normal behavior.  
• It must be easily tailored to the system. 
Every system has a different usage pattern, 
and the defense mechanism should adapt 
themselves easily to these patterns.  
• It must deal with changing system behavior 
over time as new applications are being 
added.  
• The system must have a very low false 
negative and false positive rate. 
Since a typical IDS generates a large amount of 
traffic and events in its logs, the key is for the system 
to only generate alerts on events of interest. An 
effective IDS has a low rate of false positives and 
false negatives. 
 
Table 1 - True positives and negatives 
 
 POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
TRUE Alerts when there 
is malicious traffic 
Silent when traffic 
is benign 
FALSE Alerts when traffic 
is benign 
Silent when 
malicious traffic 
occurs 
 
The ideal tuning of an IDS, therefore, maximizes the 
instances of true positives and true negatives. 
 
3. CLASSIFICATION OF INRUSION 
DETECTION SYSTEMS 
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There are many different ways to classify the 
various types of IDS in a production network. These 
classifications are not mutually exclusive; for 
instance, a network-based IDS may be using the 
signature-based approach to detection. The following 
diagram describes the most common methodologies 
of IDS classifications, although the list is certainly 
not exhaustive. 
 
3.1. Host-based IDS  
A host-based IDS (HIDS) is an IDS that 
generally operates within a computer, node or device. 
Its main function is internal monitoring, although 
many variants of HIDS have been developed that can 
be used to monitor networks (Singh & Singh, 2014). 
Primarily, it monitors and analyzes the internals of a 
computer, node or device. An HIDS determines if a 
system has been compromised and warns 
administrators accordingly (de Boer & Pels, 2005). 
For example, it can detect a rogue program that 
accesses a system’s resources in a suspicious manner, 
or discover that a program has modified the registry 
in a harmful way. 
HIDSs were the first types of intrusion 
detection software to have been designed (Gupta, 
2015). Unlike network-based IDSs, an HIDS can 
inspect the full communications stream. NIDS 
evasion techniques, such as fragmentation attacks or 
session splicing, do not apply because the HIDS is 
able to inspect the fully recombined session as it is 
presented to the operating system (Hay & Cid, 2008). 
Encrypted communications can be monitored because 
an HIDS inspection can look at the traffic before it is 
encrypted. This means that HIDS signatures will still 
be able to match against common attacks and not be 
blinded by encryption. 
An HIDS is also capable of performing 
additional system level checks that only IDS software 
installed on a host machine can do, such as file 
integrity checking, registry monitoring, log analysis, 
rootkit detection, and active response (Hay & Cid, 
2008).  
 
3.2. Network-based IDS 
A network-based IDS (NIDS) differs from 
an HIDS in that it is usually placed along a LAN 
wire. It attempts to discover unauthorized and 
malicious access to a LAN by analyzing traffic that 
traverses the wire to multiple hosts. There are many 
algorithms for detecting malicious traffic, but they 
generally read inbound and outgoing packets and 
searches for any suspicious patterns. Any alert 
generated by an NIDS allows it to notify 
administrators or take active actions such as blocking 
the source IP address. 
Three of the most common placements of NIDS are 
directly connecting it to a switch spanning port, using 
a network tap, and connected inline. 
 
External Network
IDS Sensor
 
Figure 1 - IDS using a switch spanning port 
 
Figure 3 shows the IDS connected to a switch 
that has SPAN port configuration capability. On some 
managed switches, a SPAN port can be configured to 
send all packets on the network to that port as well as 
their ultimate destination (Baker, Beale, Caswell & 
Poor, 2004). In this configuration, the switch copies 
all traffic it receives to the IDS interface being used 
to monitor traffic. The major downside of this method 
is increased bandwidth and resource usage, since the 
switch must work twice as hard to deliver traffic. 
Very few modern LANs use hubs due to the 
lack of security. Hubs allow systems to intercept 
traffic not intentionally sent to them. When using 
either a hub or switch with SPAN port capabilities, 
the systems on the internal network are not at the 
mercy of the IDS having a system failure brining the 
network down (Pappas, 2008). Making use of a 
switch SPAN port is a common method of connecting 
sensors. 
 
External Network
IDS Sensor  
Figure 2 - IDS using network tap 
 
Figure 4 shows an IDS using a network tap, 
which essentially replicates data passed through the 
wire. Network taps are not commonly found in 
typical computer networks but may be purchased 
(Pappas, 2008). Taps are handy when a network 
administrator needs to setup a hasty monitoring 
solution, perhaps to troubleshoot a problem or 
temporarily deploy an IDS (Pappas, 2008). Overall, a 
network tap is needed when the network does not 
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have managed switches, is not using hubs, or when 
putting an IDS inline is impractical. 
 
External Network
IDS Sensor
 
Figure 3 - IDS connected inline 
 
Figure 5 illustrates an IDS connected inline. 
This instance includes two connections, shown in red, 
with one connected to the uplink port of the switch, 
and the second connected to the external network. In 
most cases, this is not the best method to use because 
system failure of the IDS will prevent systems on the 
internal network from communicating with external 
systems (Pappas, 2008).  
However, the benefit of the inline 
configuration is a guarantee all packets will be seen 
by the IDS. Packets are subject to being missed when 
an IDS is connected to a switch SPAN port, 
especially when that switch is busy processing a large 
burst of traffic. Missed traffic may be lost forever if 
they were not captured by a network sniffing 
protocol. Depending on the capability of an inline 
IDS, a similar burst may lead to congestion of 
network performance. 
Although an NIDS is a powerful monitoring 
system for network traffic, there are several 
disadvantages (Hay & Cid, 2008). Common NIDS 
evasion techniques such as fragmentation attacks, 
session splicing, and even denial-of-service (DoS) 
attacks can be used to bypass an NIDS, rendering it 
useless. If the communications between hosts are 
encrypted, a passive NIDS does not have the ability 
to unencrypt a message in transition. 
 
3.3. Signature-based Detection 
In the signature-based approach, an IDS looks 
for packets and compares them with predefined rules 
or patterns known as signatures that are defined in the 
database. These attack signatures pass specific traffic 
or activity that is based on known intrusive activity 
(Gupta, 2015). The main advantage of this technique 
is the simple and efficient processing of audit data. 
Signature-based approaches have a much lower rate 
of false positives. On the other hand, the very nature 
of signature-based detection means that such an 
approach is ineffective against zero-day attacks for 
which there may not be a discovered ruleset or 
established method of attack yet. With the rate of new 
attacks and malicious activities every hour, a 
signature-based IDS is only as good as the recency of 
its signature database and rulesets. 
 
3.4. Anomaly-based Detection 
Anomaly-based IDS works by identifying 
patterns from users or groups of users already 
defined. This approach looks for variations and 
deviations from an established baseline behavior 
which might indicate malice. It involves increased 
amount of processing which is used by anomaly 
detector for studying the behavior of the system from 
its audits (Cannady & Harrell, 1996). The baseline 
must first be created of the system, network or 
program activity. This baseline is the profile of what 
a normal scenario, usage, bandwidth or behavior 
would look like in a specific network environment. 
Thereafter, any activity that deviates from the 
baseline is treated as a possible intrusion (Gangwar & 
Sahu, 2014) and an alert would be generated. 
The biggest advantage of anomaly-based 
approach is its ability to detect zero-day attacks, since 
it does not depend on an established signature 
database, but merely deviations from an established 
baseline. The behavior of each target system or 
network is unique, therefore anomaly-based 
approaches use customized profiles which in turn 
make it difficult for an attacker to know with 
certainty what activity it can carry off without setting 
off an alarm. 
On the other hand, anomaly-based IDSs have 
a high false positive rate. It also requires time to 
establish a baseline behavior when it is first placed in 
a new network environment or host device. These 
systems are also more complex and the difficulty of 
associating an alarm with the specific event that 
triggered that alarm (Gupta, 2015).  
 
Table 2 - Comparison between different IDS classifications 
 
Type Advantages Disadvantages 
HIDS 1. More 
accurate in 
intrusion 
detection 
2. Able to 
detect 
encrypted 
attacks. 
3. Does not 
require 
additional 
hardware 
1. Higher cost. 
2. May cause 
performance 
issues or 
resource 
hogging. 
NIDS 1. Low cost. 
2. Detect 
network-
based 
attacks 
such as 
1. High 
fluctuations in 
network 
traffic cause 
packets to be 
lost. 
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denial-of-
service 
attacks. 
2. Requires 
more CPU 
power and 
resources in a 
large-scale 
LAN. 
3. Unable to 
analyze 
encrypted 
packets. 
Anomaly-
based 
1. Ability to 
detect zero-
day attack 
attempts. 
2. Low false 
negative 
rate. 
1. Slow to work 
when placed 
in a new 
environment. 
2. High false 
positive rate. 
3. Low detection 
rate for 
known 
attacks. 
Signature-
based 
1. High 
response 
time for 
known 
attacks. 
2. Low false 
positive 
rate. 
1. Limited 
capability to 
detect zero-
day attacks. 
2. Signature 
database must 
be updated 
frequently. 
 
3.5. Passive and Active IDS 
When classifying IDSs, we can also 
categorize them by the way IDSs respond during an 
attack. A passive IDS merely records, analyzes, logs 
and alerts an administrator about the possibility of an 
attack. In terms of placement, passive IDSs are 
generally placed off to the side in a network. 
An active IDS can take actions when it 
detects a possible intrusion, such as blocking further 
traffic from a specific network source or locking 
down the system with safe mode. In modern security 
systems, an active IDS is also known as an Intrusion 
Prevention System (IPS). IPSs are placed inline in a 
network. 
 
3.5.1 Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) 
The main function of an IPS is to intervene 
in cases of suspected attacks. Generally, an IPS is 
essentially a combination of access control devices – 
such as firewalls and routers – and IDSs. In other 
words, an IPS is an IDS with access control 
capabilities or active response methods. 
Like IDSs, an IPS can be host-based or 
network-based, and uses anomaly-based detection 
(prevention) or a signature- or ruleset-based 
approach.  
The following are common countermeasures 
implemented by IPSs: 
• Denying the traffic. This is the simplest 
method, where the intrusion system blocks 
the IP addresses and ports involved – both 
source and destination. The downside to this 
method is that many devices on the global 
network are hidden behind a global address. 
Blocking that address will also block other 
legitimate traffic that may be located behind 
that address. 
• Active logging. Although logging is a 
feature shared by IDSs, an IPS can increase 
the usability of a log by, for example, 
automatically exporting traffic logs that 
meet certain criteria to external network 
analysis software such as Wireshark. 
• Communicating with a separate device with 
access control capabilities. Many modern 
IDSs and IPSs also complement the 
operations of a LAN by communicating with 
an external, or separate, firewall or router, 
which have access control capabilities. In 
the event of an intrusion, an IDS/IPS can 
send an alert or request to a firewall or 
router. The firewall or router will then take 
the necessary actions to deal with the 
intrusion, such as dropping the packets or 
blocking further traffic from that source. 
• Sending a TCP reset (Carter, 2005). If an 
attack is a TCP-based attack, an IPS can 
send a reset signal back to the attacker’s 
protocol stack, which would close the 
current session, and can be repeated as 
frequently as needed. 
• Setting an SNMP trap (Burns, Adesina & 
Barker, 2012). When an alarm is triggered, 
the intrusion system will send an SNMP trap 
to indicate to an SNMP management system 
that a network or device is under attack. The 
management system can choose to take an 
action based on the event, such as polling 
the agent directly, or polling other associated 
device agent to get a better understanding of 
the event. 
 
3.5.2 IPS or IDS? 
Although the market trend is focusing on 
IPS rather than IDS with the advancement of DDoS 
attacks (Fuchsberger, 2005), there are reasons to 
choose between an IPS and an IDS. IDS rarely cause 
latency in network traffic, because it is generally off 
to the side (unless placed inline) and all traffic are 
merely copied to the sensor. An IPS, on the other 
hand, may cause small delays in traffic because its 
inline placement means that every packet has to be 
inspected and analyzed before being forwarded to its 
destination. 
If an intrusion system is disabled, for 
example by accident or power outage, an IDS will not 
cause denial of service due to its positioning. An IPS, 
which would have to be connected inline, would 
negate the availability of network resources. Modern 
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IPSs have preventive mechanisms such as fault 
tolerance or backup power to minimize disruption to 
network activities. 
If cost is an issue, many routers such as 
Cisco® routers allow specific modules or firmware to 
be installed on top of the existing routers to provide 
intrusion detection and prevention capabilities.  
 
4. DETECTION TECHNIQUES 
 
From different sources, systems like rule-
based expert systems, state transition analysis, and 
genetic algorithms are direct and efficient ways to 
implement signature detection. Inductive sequential 
patterns, artificial neural networks, statistical analysis 
and data mining methods have been used in anomaly 
detection. There are different kinds of frameworks 
used for anomaly-based detection.   
This section presents an extensive study over 
the various intrusion detection classifier techniques 
and hybrid detection techniques. A few proposed 
methods could be described as follows.  
 
4.1. Bayesian Networks 
Bayesian networks are probabilistic 
graphical models that represent sets of variables and 
their probabilistic independencies. Bayesian theory is 
named after Thomas Bayes. His theory can be 
explained as follows: 
If the events A1, A2, … and An constitute a 
partition of the sample space S such that P(Ak) ≠ 0 for 
k = 1,2 , … , n, then for any event B such that P(B) ≠ 
0:  
 
Darwiche, et. al (2010) stipulated that 
Bayesian networks have been used in many computer 
science fields, such as email spam filters, speech 
recognition and pattern recognition, because of their 
ability to build coherent results by using probabilistic 
information about a specific situation. 
Bayesian networks are directed acyclic 
graphs where the nodes represent variables and 
whose edges encode conditional dependencies 
between those variables (D. Heckerman, 1995). 
These are applied to anomaly detection in so many 
ways; for example, Valdes et al. has developed an 
anomaly detection system that employed naive 
Bayes, which is a two-layer Bayesian network that 
assumes complete independency between the nodes. 
 
4.2. Genetic Algorithm (GA) 
GA is a search technique that is used to find 
an appropriate solution to search problems. Genetic 
algorithms have been applied in anomaly detection in 
many ways, as they are flexible and a powerful search 
method. Some network intrusion detection 
approaches have used genetic algorithms for the 
classification of instances, while others like fuzzy 
data mining approach have applied this technique for 
feature selection. To list out an advantage of GA, it 
selects the best feature and has better efficiency but 
its method is complex. 
 
4.3. Inductive Rule Generation Algorithms 
These algorithms are one of the most famous 
techniques used. In this technique, we have a 
predictive model decision tree that maps observations 
of an item to conclusions about the item’s target 
value. 
The decision tree (DT) is very powerful and 
popular data mining algorithm for decision-making 
and classification problems. It is also used in many 
real-life applications like medical diagnosis, radar 
signal classification, weather prediction, credit 
approval, and fraud detection. This decision tree can 
be constructed from large volume of dataset with 
many attributes, because the tree size is independent 
of the dataset size. It can process both numerical and 
categorical data but trees created from numeric 
datasets can be complex. Construction of inductive 
rule generation algorithms may not require any 
domain knowledge. It can handle high dimensional 
data and the representation is easy to understand (R. 
Patel, A. Thakkar and A. Ganatra, 2012). However, it 
is limited to one output attribute. Decision tree 
algorithms are unstable and most decision tree 
construction methods are non-backtracking, 
 
4.4. Outlier Detection 
Outlier detection approach is based on the 
idea of semi-supervised learning in which the system 
would learn a baseline data, and consider any 
instances that do not fit in the normal data profile as 
an anomaly. 
Most of the anomaly detection algorithms 
require a set of baseline data to train the model, and 
they assume that anomalies can be treated as patterns 
never observed before. Since an outlier is defined as a 
data point which is very different from the rest of the 
data, so based on some measure, we employ several 
outlier detection schemes to see how efficiently these 
schemes may deal with the problems of anomaly 
detection. In statistics-based outlier detection 
techniques, the data points are modeled using a 
stochastic distribution and these points are 
determined to be outliers depending upon their 
relationship with this model. 
 
4.5. Clustering 
This technique is based on two important 
assumptions (L. Portnoy, E. Eskin, & S.J. Stolfo., 
2001). First, majority of the network connections 
represent normal traffic and only a very small 
percentage of that traffic is malicious. And second, 
malicious traffic is statistically different from normal 
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traffic. Anomalies will be detected based on their 
cluster size, i.e., large clusters are meant to be 
baseline data, and the rest correspond to malicious 
attacks. 
Clustering is unsupervised learning. 
Labeling the data is not necessary and natural patterns 
in the data are extracted. It does not require the use of 
a labeled data set for training. 
 
4.6. Neural Networks 
Neural networks are networks of 
computational units that jointly implement complex 
mapping functions. First, the networks are trained 
with a labeled data set. Testing instances are then fed 
into the network to be classified as either normal or 
anomalous. An example of the neural network 
technique which is widely used in anomaly detection 
is the Support Vector Machines (SVM) (S. 
Mukkamala, G. Janoski, and A. Sung, 2002). 
This method would be effective if the exact 
characteristics of the attack are already known. 
However, these intrusions are constantly changing 
because of the individual approaches taken by the 
attackers and regular changes done in the software 
and hardware of the targeted systems. Because of the 
wide variety of attacks and attackers despite their 
dedicated effort to constantly update the rule base of 
an expert system can never hope to accurately 
identify the variety of intrusions. 
For these constantly changing natures of 
these network attacks, we require a flexible defensive 
system that can analyze these enormous amounts of 
network traffic in a manner, which is less structured 
than rule-based systems. For example, a neural 
network-based signature detection system could 
potentially address many of the problems that are 
found in rule-based systems. The inherent speed of 
neural networks is another benefit of this approach, as 
it requires a timely identification of attacks, and the 
processing speed of the neural networks could enable 
intrusion responses to be conducted before 
irreversible damage could be done to the system. It 
has a high signal-to-noise ratio and requires more 
time and more sample-training phase. 
 
4.7. Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic starts and builds on a set of 
user-supplied human language rules. The fuzzy 
systems convert these rules into their mathematical 
equivalents. This simplifies the job of the system 
designer and the computer, and results in a much 
more accurate representation in the way systems 
behave in the real world. Fuzzy logic is also simple 
and flexible. It can handle problems arising from 
imprecise and incomplete data, and model nonlinear 
functions of arbitrary complexities. Fuzzy logic 
techniques have been employed in the computer 
security field since the early 90’s (Hosmer, 1993). Its 
ability to model complex systems makes it a valid 
alternative in the computer security field to analyze 
continuous sources of data and even unknown or 
imprecise processes (Hosmer, 1993).  
Fuzzy logic has the potential in the intrusion 
detection field when compared to those systems using 
strict signature based matching or classic pattern 
deviation detection. Bridges and Vaughn (2000) state 
that the concept of security itself is fuzzy. And in 
other words, the concept of fuzziness helps to smooth 
out the abrupt separation of normal behavior from 
abnormal behavior. This means a given data point 
falling outside a defined baseline interval, will be 
considered anomalous to the same degree regardless 
of its distance from the interval. Fuzzy logic has a 
capability to represent imprecise forms of reasoning 
in areas where firm decisions must be made in 
indefinite environments like intrusion detection.  
Dokas et al. (2002) suggested a model that 
works by building rare class prediction models for 
identifying known intrusions and their variations and 
anomaly/outlier detection schemes for detecting 
novel attacks whose nature is unknown.   
Researchers propose techniques to generate 
fuzzy classifiers using genetic algorithms that can 
detect anomalies and some specific intrusions. The 
main idea was to evolve two rules; one for the normal 
class and other for the abnormal class using a 
baseline profile data set. 
 
5. COMPARISON OF TECHNIQUES 
 
In this section, we look at how the various 
intrusion detection techniques compare, and in what 
situations are they best suited for. Each technique or 
approach to programming the system to recognize 
intrusion or outright threats have different variables 
involved for defining the exclusionary or inclusionary 
criteria for defining what constitutes a threat. Our 
review of each technique poses a challenge in 
determining suitable techniques based on the 
system’s specific needs and awareness of threats in 
relationship to risk assessment. In the business world, 
how the technique will be applied to the system 
directly relates to the purpose and function of the 
system to meet business needs. While this is 
simplistic, there is also thematic attachment to 
deriving application of the technique within specific 
and definable parameters of the system. 
However, and because of global business 
implication to managing the firm’s technology as an 
asset and understanding how the firm needs 
interactions with unknown clients, there is a need for 
basing technique upon flexible patterns of 
information sharing. Biermann, Cloete, and Venter 
(2001) regard a means of devising clear intent in 
terms of each techniques drawbacks and advantages 
of use. The system must define the technique and 
compare them based upon availability, utility, 
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integrity, authenticity, confidentially, and possession 
(Biermann, Cloete, & Venter, 2001). 
Hubballi and Suryanarayanan (2014) find that 
part of the issue with defining the parameters of the 
IDS and therefore strategically determining the 
specific technique and purpose, also rides upon how 
well each technique can recognize events without 
error. They contend that a signature-based design 
may be ineffective in the constant need to rewrite 
parameters to re-identify the threat, such that 
“discovery of new flaws and vulnerabilities occur 
continuously, to write good signatures one needs to 
have complete understanding of the behavior and also 
sufficient data to analyze. Due to this dependency, 
this method is always error prone.” 
Such a technique may not allow for gray areas 
and therefore should be replaced by fuzzy logic 
where parameters are protected by filtering for what 
may be depicted as an error. The signature may not fit 
with the rule based logic applied or within the 
signature, or the rules are too stringent and therefore, 
information packets are seen as threats when instead 
they are not (false positivity). Rewriting the rule 
causes a continuous action and need for the system to 
learn from itself rather than specific directions/rules 
set in place. 
Another relationship between techniques to 
consider is how similar these structures function 
within the design of the system to point to specific 
correlative formats for alarms where they are seen in 
normative and rules-based functionality. Bayesian 
algorithms capture the same essence as the signature 
approach where rules-based definitions of threats also 
apply. Xiao et al. (2014, p. 128) comment that the 
reason for choosing the Bayesian derived techniques 
coincides with robust modeling and “joint distribution 
of random variables and reasoning under 
uncertainty.”  
Even with this logic, Xiao et al. (2014) find 
weakness in the node function of the technique and 
how these nodes present opportunities for false 
alarms just as found in the signature based technique. 
Continued application of knowledge and loading the 
patterns to seek in defining the level of safe with 
uncertain requires continued revision of the system. 
Xiao et al. (2014) determine that utilizing Bayesian 
algorithms at the core of the IDS also means adopting 
further tools within the design toward a hybrid model. 
Hybrid augmentation seeks a dual platform for 
filtering the information based upon extensions where 
dynamic coding for applying human behavior 
modelling opens up functionality for greater leverage 
between identifying factors of certainty and 
uncertainty. Such further design based upon the 
Bayesian approach continues the robustness of the 
framework but allows for analytics to be applied in a 
way that considers profoundly shifting the variables 
for non-threat and threat definers. Taking a step 
further to analyze the definition allows for greater 
functionality and less false alarms. 
Differences in approach bordering on hybrid 
design also focuses upon fuzzy logic and clustering 
techniques. However, clustering and fuzzy logic can 
only be used in situations where there is a broad basis 
for data analysis and there is the expected element of 
learning from the data. These forms of IDS 
techniques would not work well in situations where 
the needs of the administrator are simply to block 
rules based packets of information. Systems defined 
by a set of prerequisites as a single layer of function 
would not need the depth or level of precision 
implied from the use of the clustering or fuzzy logic. 
Indeed, such systems would not need the hybrid 
approach either but may function best with Bayesian 
or signature based techniques as the points of 
identifiers are clear.  
Fuzzy logic and clustering allow for further 
dissemination and critical review of data as the 
application is in real time which works better for soft 
computing or cloud systems (Ashfaq et al., 2017). Lin 
et al. (2015) determine that the use of clustering 
proves desirable because it can integrate similar 
themes or traits with the timing of receiving the data 
with the needs of the system and its activities. 
Integration serves to provide the system with clear 
messages of what information is partitioned, where, 
and why. Due to the level of detail, situations that call 
for a simpler solution will not justify investing in 
such intricate design features unless the activity level 
or purpose of the administrator’s actions warrant such 
protections (Mitrokotsa & Dimitrakakis, 2013). 
Kabir, Onik, and Samad (2017) remark that the 
weakness of the Bayesian approach is due to its 
popularity and widespread usage as the preferred 
method. This points to the need for a flexible hybrid 
or dual platform where learning contributes to the 
evolution of the system. Therefore, Kabir et al. 
(2017) find that Bayesian programming is a strong 
foundation but that ultimately technique design 
should move towards featuring clusters for 
anomalous behaviors, where one part determines the 
“true” user while the other determines normal 
patterns of behavior of that user.  
With the migration toward soft computing and 
cloud data storage systems, IDS and techniques need 
to be focused on providing classifiers for cross 
validation of data sources where there is little time 
discrepancy. The technique must have parameters for 
all time temporalities (Mitrokotsa & Dimitrakakis, 
2013). The concept of robustness remains central to 
the design of a technique that meets the needs of 
business functionality and multi-dimensions of time. 
This calls for a technique based in robustness, sturdy 
and strict in rules-based procedures but also learning 
from uncertain information, such as possible false 
positives.  
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Wang et al. (2010) support the use of fuzzy 
clustering to maneuver uncertainty for classifying 
attacks to the system as the business needs grows 
more toward application of risky interactions. Being 
fuzzy means the data is uncertain or falling into an 
undefinable realm per the rules based system and 
even anomaly definition. The gray area of data will 
find similar traits, common threads, and reasoning for 
being grouped together. The fuzzy cluster hybrid as a 
technique finds strength in weaving between levels 
and sharing, and learning from the information of the 
system rather than falsely believing that the 
information is a threat. Issues with this approach 
pertain to installing hybrid forms of security 
measures where the data must unlock rules to move 
within the system. Wang et al. (2010) demonstrate 
how this may create limitation where there are walls 
to block information exchange but without further 
clustering to the result, the threat will be blocked or 
partitioned off to serve the needs of one group 
defined by the cluster. Wang et al. (2010) find how 
this can provide further design features and 
usefulness for the user in terms of who has access to 
the data and who does not. If data is found to be a 
threat, then because of the clustering effect, the 
system is protected but the data is still analyzed on 
some level of value to the firm. What proves to be 
beneficial is the ability to learn from the data while 
keeping it separated from other sensitive and 
proprietary data as intellectual property (Ashfaq et 
al., 2017). 
 
 
6. CURRENT TRENDS 
 
As the world moves towards cloud computing, 
mobile applications and wireless networks, 
information security is more crucial than ever. A 
survey report by the Computer Security Institute 
found that 45.6 per cent of respondents reported that 
they had been subject to at least one targeted attack in 
the past year (Richardson, 2011). Data breaches has 
cost companies billions of dollars in damages and lost 
assets. The biggest threats to network security are 
disgruntled former employees and attacks from 
outside the company (Schneider, 2012). 
The field of intrusion detection and prevention is 
still in its infancy (Hunt & Zeadally, 2012). By using 
probing tools, some attackers explore a victim's 
network prior to launching an attack. A sophisticated 
IDS may be able to correlate data obtained from the 
attacker's reconnaissance – possibly along with 
additional log data – to either forecast the attack or to 
obtain better forensic evidence during or after the 
attack (Hunt & Zeadally, 2012). However, although 
some progress has been made recently with 
distributed IDS architectures, many IDSs cannot 
detect complex intrusions and distributed or 
coordinated attacks (Zhou, Leckie & Karunaseckera, 
2010). 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
We have introduced an overview of the 
different types of intrusion detection systems, 
approaches, methodologies and techniques for IDSs. 
Each technique and class of IDS has its superiority 
and limitations, so we should be mindful when 
selecting the best approach. We compared and 
contrasted each technique and approach to determine 
which works best in a particular situation. We 
focused our study on the most common intrusion 
detection models such as NIDS and HIDS, and both 
the anomaly- and signature-based approach to 
detection. Finally we also presented current trends in 
the world of information and network security in the 
last several years and the direction that information 
technology is heading to. 
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